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In the midst of the crisis, equity should be sought not 
only by mitigating as much as possible the inequities 
of the adjustment process, but also, and primarily, by 
considering to what extent the necessary reorienta-
tion of development can give rise to more equitable 
socioeconomic systems. 
The post-war development style of Latin Amer-
ica has ultimately resulted in crisis. The international 
economic order during which this style evolved is 
changing rapidly and profoundly. Both the solution 
of the crisis and the long-term reinsertion of our 
countries into the international economy call for a 
reorientation of development patterns. 
Sustained growth, in the present circumstances, 
will require certain unavoidable conditions to be met. 
These include alleviation of the debt burden, growth 
in conjunction with a trade surplus, a liberalization 
of exports, new patterns of production based on 
achieving and maintaining international competi-
tiveness, together with social linkages, the reform of 
the State and the consolidation of democracy. To 
what extent can these conditions bring about more 
equity? 
The necessary external adjustment of econo-
mies entails unavoidable inequities. The only possi-
bility is to keep this inequity within certain limits, 
attempting to make the adjustment as expansionary 
and efficient as possible, and ensuring that policies 
are included to safeguard equity. 
Prospects for greater equity are subject to the 
choices involved in the required reorientation of 
development. The current world-wide technological 
. revolution is simultaneously producing both disrup-
tions and opportunities in favour of an integral, 
equitable development. These opportunities can 
come from the new bases of economic dynamism, the 
central role of technological progress and the incor-
poration of know-how into production, to the extent 
that a combination of development processes with 
growing social cohesion is produced. 
•Director of the Economic Development Division. 
The author is grateful for Patricio Mujica's comments on a 
draft of this text, although they may not all have been duly 
incorporated. 
Introduction 
The protest against inequity in the distribution 
of well-being and in opportunities for individual 
advancement, and against the fact that the 
effects of macroeconomic adjustments are not 
equally shared, has become a cry that goes 
beyond Latin American societies. It comes from 
social leaders of every stamp and is echoed by 
ever larger contingents of the critically poor, 
badly paid workers, the underemployed and 
unemployed, and sections of the middle class 
whose standards of living and quality of life have 
deteriorated. 
The protest is not new. Its basis may be 
found in the inequity characteristic of Latin 
American post-war development. It has become 
an outcry in the face of the unprecedented mag-
nitude of the adjustments being experienced by 
the Latin American economies and State admin-
istrations, the high social cost involved, and the 
frustration arising from the failure to recover 
sustained growth. 
The search for equitable development has 
thus become not only an ethical imperative of 
societies and public policy, but so a functional 
requirement for social stability and consolidat-
ing democracy, and an historical imperative to 
reformulate the destiny of the Latin American 
nations in a changing world. 
The answers to this outcry, however, must 
be considered carefully. The crisis that the coun-
tries of this region are undergoing is structural. 
Therefore overcoming it calls for a change in 
development style. But there is no guarantee of 
success in the search for ways to develop which 
would lay the foundations for more just societies, 
and which would at the same time represent a 
functional insertion into the world emerging 
from present changes. Achieving such develop-
ment depends on delicate and special combina-
tions of societal processes. 
On the other hand, critical situations make it 
urgent to begin to travel the —perhaps long— 
roads towards a solution. This imperative is clear 
on both the social front and in the different 
dimensions of the economic structure and State 
administrations. The cumulative effects of the 
prolonged crisis have added new constraints to 
sustained growth. The external debt, the 
rationing of capital and the transfer of resources 
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abroad, the weakening of investment processes 
and the deterioration of basic capital, fiscal 
weakness and inflationary pressures have 
become part of the functioning structure of Latin 
American economies. 
The situations of inequity that plague our 
countries are therefore conditioned structurally 
as much as by the critical economic situation. 
The solution on both levels presupposes 
reorienting development. However, for this 
reorientation to take place, the economies and 
the societies themselves must adjust to more 
balanced models of operation. But for such 
models to endure and consolidate themselves 
economically and politically, and thus make it 
possible to overcome the crisis, profound and 
coherent changes are needed in the economic 
and social structure. Whether these changes will 
be equitable or not will depend on whether the 
new styles of development are capable of 
transforming the historical contradictions 
1. Growth and equity; universal patterns 
vs. structural configurations 
The persistent inequality in Latin American 
post-war development can be interpreted in dif-
ferent ways. The most common interpretations 
originate in the hypothesis that there exists one 
universal pattern of modernization and develop-
ment (Kuznets, 1955). According to this 
hypothesis, inequalities would increase in the 
initial stages of the process, but would begin to 
diminish once a certain state of development 
was reached. Some proponents of this theory 
point to the insufficient degree of modernization 
and distortions —mainly institutional orof pub-
lic policy— which hinder the process, and pres-
cribe strategies centred on institutional reforms 
and on promoting growth, in order to produce 
more quickly the effects of the "trickle-down". 
between growth and equity into a dynamic 
complementarity. 
The relations between growth and equity 
must be examined in the historical context of the 
Latin American development style (section I) 
and of its crisis, which brings new characteristics 
to the structural configuration (section II). The 
internal contradictions of the development style 
and the changes in the international order, in the 
historical context of which the development 
style unfolds (section HI), indicate certain neces-
sary conditions for sustaining a new phase of 
development (section IV). 
The economic adjustments required to enter 
this new phase involve elements of inequity 
(section V). But a reorientation of development 
which takes into account the new historical con-
text and which is based on a greater incorpora-
tion of knowledge, is not only sustainable, but 
also entails the possibility that growth and 
equity will complement one another in the long 
term (section VI). 
Other proponents of the theory, however, 
recognize the excessive length of time involved 
before the effects trickle down and advise the 
authorities to adopt measures to modify some of 
the structural factors which condition the pro-
cess and limit the inequalities generated in the 
initial phases of transformation (Chenery et ai, 
1974). 
On the opposite extreme, formulations of 
"another development" reject the hypothesis of 
a universal pattern and call for the adoption of 
other ways to develop, based on a different 
understanding of modernization —ways which 
give priority to both ecology and equity in meet-
ing basic human needs (Dag Hammarskjòld 
Foundation, 1975). 
In our opinion, the assumption that there 
are basic universal trends —although not neces-
sarily predictable— in technology, the organiza-
I 
The exclusionary character of the Latin American 
style of development 
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tion of production, demands and values, is 
compatible with the recognition that the courses 
of development of each society are historically 
specific. These courses, moreover, take place in 
historically specific international contexts. 
Noting the existence of very general pat-
terns of change and development (Kuznets, 
1966; Chenery and Syrquin, 1975) does not jus-
tify, however, accepting simple relations 
between growth and equity, based on a model 
universally applicable, even though it may recog-
nize variants according to the "types of coun-
tries". What the recognition of these general 
patterns certainly rejects, on the other hand, is 
the possibility that another development model 
in contradiction with such trends, may be 
successful. 
However, within the field of influence of 
these universal trends, development "styles" can 
coexist (Pinto, 1976; Graciarena, 1976), charac-
terized by different structural configurations, 
which involve, among others, different relations 
between growth and equity. There is historical 
evidence of other countries with income and 
development levels comparable to those preval-
ent in Latin America, but with different structu-
ral configurations, which in past decades 
combined considerable dynamism with reason-
able degrees of equity (Fajnzylber, 1989). 
These considerations justify the interpreta-
tion of the persistent inequalities of the region 
within the framework of the configuration of the 
structural features that have characterized the 
post-war style of Latin American development. 
It is difficult to understand the relations between 
growth and equity outside of this context. On the 
other hand, the search for equitable develop-
ment leads necessarily to the configuration of a 
style that involves greater equity in sharing the 
fruits of growth. Such a style should therefore 
entail implicit relations of complementarity 
between growth and equity. 
More than the presence of one or another 
feature, it is the overall structural configuration 
and its modality of functioning which deter-
mines the character of the relations between 
growth and equity. Therefore it is appropriate, 
first, to sum up this development style from an 
economic perspective, and then identify the 
structural imbalances that have affected growth 
and determined its exclusionary character. 
2. The structural features common to the style 
Beyond the peculiarities and differences in the 
overall opportunities represented in each coun-
try by natural resources, the size and degree of 
development of the national economy and the 
characteristics of the social and institutional sys-
tem, the functioning of the post-war economies 
in Latin America has been characterized by a 
combination of common and interrelated struc-
tural features. 
i) International specialization based on nat-
ural resources. Participation in international 
trade continued to be based on primary goods, in 
spite of significant industrialization. The impe-
tus of the external sector remained therefore 
subject to the alternatives and trends of interna-
tional demand for these goods and to the insta-
bility of their prices. Even in the more notable 
cases of diversifying exports to favour manufac-
tured products, most of these products were 
derived from the elaboration of natural resour-
ces. They were to a large extent basic industrial 
products, the international markets for which at 
present reproduce conditions similar to those 
which have traditionally characterized commod-
ity markets. 
Ü) Domestic dynamism based on consump-
tion. Domestic dynamism, a motor of growth in 
the face of the instability and insecurity of exter-
nal stimuli, was based on the continuous expan-
sion of consumption, both private and public. 
Investments —including a considerable fraction 
of public investment— were encouraged above 
all by increasing demand for consumption and 
complementary public services. This demand 
was stimulated by an increase in real income and 
by the rapid formation of new social strata, as a 
result of industrialization and urbanization. 
iii) Patterns of imitative consumption. 
Given its highly imitative characteristics, 
growth based on expanding consumption was 
oriented towards producing locally a basket of 
goods similar to that of the most advanced 
nation on earth. The pattern of public expendi-
ture, in turn, generally supported imitative 
trends instead of trying to correct them. 
iv) The orientation of industrialization 
towards the domestic market and productive dis-
articulation. In accord with dynamism based on 
consumption and its highly imitative character-
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istics, industrialization was oriented towards the 
domestic market. This pattern of industrializa-
tion "from the outset" has tended, across the 
whole vector of consumption, to form unco-
ordinated industrial apparatuses. Moreover, it 
has led to increasingly complex processes, with 
higher densities of capital and larger scales, 
which have brought on greater needs of invest-
ment per unit produced and underutilized pro-
duction capacity. The higher costs involved have 
led to a situation where the protection of each 
activity generally was above and beyond what 
was required by the processes of industrial and 
technological learning. 
v) Technological weakness and the lack of 
international competitiveness. The urgency of 
reproducing on the local level the consumption 
levels of developed societies and industrializa-
tion oriented towards expanding domestic 
markets led to a superficial and costly incorpora-
tion of imported technologies, without a corres-
ponding development of local technological 
capacity. Unco-ordinated production, moreover, 
entails a structural fragility of the system for 
disseminating technical progress. This syste-
matic technological weakness constitutes in turn 
a deeper cause of the lack of international com-
petitiveness than the protection of activities 
technologically solid but vulnerable from the 
economic viewpoint. 
vi) The weakness of local entrepreneurs in 
the accumulation process and in technical pro-
gress. In most cases, leadership in industrial 
activities bringing technical progress, which 
give national industry its profile, was assumed by 
the State rather than by local private enterprises. 
On the other hand, the weight of small and 
medium enterprises is less significant in our 
countries than in other recently industrialized 
nations and it tends to form strata with techno-
logical and organizational levels considerably 
lower than those of large enterprises, giving rise 
to a good deal of structural heterogeneity within 
industrial sectors even in the most advanced 
countries of the region (Pinto, 1970). The capac-
ity of entrepreneurs for productive accumulation 
and incorporation of technical progress in gen-
eral has been much lower than needed for sus-
tained growth. The considerable capacity for 
saving of this sector has tended to be channelled 
towards luxury items, unreproductive invest-
ments, financial speculation or foreign invest-
ments —a behaviour more geared to profit than 
to entrepreneurship. 
vu) State leadership. The investment and 
innovative weakness of local entrepreneurs left 
foreign investment or the State (at times both, in 
a tacit or explicit complementarity) in charge of 
the strategic nucleus of investments for develop-
ment. Even the movement of private capital for 
investment in strategic activities often had to be 
accompanied by almost free transfers of public 
capital, an unwarranted and prolonged protec-
tion, or subsidies of different sorts. 
In addition, tariffs, exchange and credit 
instruments were used to transfer resources 
from commodity exports to urban and industrial 
activities, and from consumers and rentiers to 
investments. On the other hand, public invest-
ment in infrastructure facilitated and comple-
mented the pattern of growth founded on the 
expansion of private consumption. 
Finally, the State set itself up an essential 
mechanism for redistributing income. However, 
unlike the "welfare State" proper to the indus-
trial countries, it worked more through tariffs 
and public prices and the creation of public 
employment than by transferring social security 
and well-being. 
viii) Agrarian dualism. Although the last 
few decades have, seen significant advances in 
widening the boundaries of agriculture and 
modernizing different agricultural productions 
— with the consequent increase of 
productivity— dual structures persist within the 
agrarian sectors of most of the countries of the 
region. Alongside efficient export enterprises 
and a variety of family enterprises producing for 
the domestic market, many farmers are still 
practising subsistence agriculture. 
The presence or absence of these forms of 
agrarian dualism in the structural configuration 
of each national society is probably the factor 
that most conditions the existing development 
style, common to all the countries of the region. 
In any case, both modernization and 
agrarian underdevelopment have encouraged 
the intense processes of urbanization, which 
persist beyond the cyclical phases of urban 
economic activity. 
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3. A structurally unbalanced style 
of development ... 
The structure characterized by these features 
tends to reproduce imbalances between supply 
vectors, on the one hand, and demand vectors, on 
the other, beyond temporary adjustments. In 
this sense, the Latin American development 
style involves several interrelated structural 
imbalances, which make growth unsustainable 
over the long term. 
i) The purchasing power of exports (includ-
ing the effect of the terms of trade) tends to 
expand less than the demand for imports 
derived from both prevalent patterns of con-
sumption and public expenditure, as well as 
from the operation and expansion of productive 
apparatuses- This implies a structural tendency 
towards a trade deficit, giving rise to a chronic 
eagerness for external capital and to characteris-
tic interruptions or limitations of growth, owing 
to a lack of foreign currencies. 
ii) Investments needed to expand signifi-
cantly the potential product tend —given insuf-
ficient technological progress, a lack of 
product ive co-ordinat ion and weak 
accumulation— to surpass the capacity for real 
national savings, adjusted by the effect of the 
terms of trade. This creates a second gap, which 
requires external savings, either through 
indebtedness or through direct foreign 
investment. 
iii) External capital flows imply in turn 
future currents of interests and profits, which 
are added to the trade deficit, thus increasing the 
shortage of foreign currency, which has to be 
met with inputs from external savings. 
iv) The demand arising from the incorpora-
tion of technology far surpasses local technologi-
cal capacity and exerts pressure on the different 
ways of importing technology (capital goods, 
licencing, foreign investments). Given the insuf-
ficient investment in research and development, 
the unco-ordinated local industrial profiles and 
the technological symbiosis of transnational cor-
porations with their home offices, local techno-
logical capacity remains in a state of 
underdevelopment, which worsens the 
imbalance. 
v) The insufficient dissemination of techno-
logical progress in unco-ordinated productive 
structures prolongs intersectoral and intrasec-
toral structural heterogeneity. Not only do pro-
ductive strata with vastly unequal levels of 
productivity, technology and organization coex-
ist —a frequent feature in any economy at a 
given time— but such heterogeneity is consoli-
dated and the differences become greater, since 
productivity increments in modern or formal 
activities tend to be above average. Under the 
dominant model, of great capital density, trans-
planted technology and lack of productive co-
ordination, the modernization of the backward 
strata would require effective access to capital 
and knowledge in degrees difficult to absorb on 
the microeconomic level and probably unfeasible 
on the macroeconomic level. 
vi) The availability of the labour force tends 
to surpass the demand for modern employment 
derived from the present pattern of demand for 
goods; and demand for employment tends to 
grow less than demand for goods. Undoubtedly 
linked to imbalances between demand for and 
the supply ;of skilled labour, this structural 
imbalance gives rise to different forms of under-
utilization of human resources, which comprises 
the other side of structural heterogeneity of pro-
ductive systems. 
vii) On the level of accumulation, the struc-
tural configuration is seen in the imbalance 
between investments needed to achieve sus-
tained growth, progressively eliminating struc-
tural heterogeneity and underemployment, and 
the investments needed for the expansion of 
productive capacity with the present structure. 
This discrepancy, moreover, increases when the 
conditions of the external sector and the mobili-
zation of domestic savings restrict the attainable 
rate of investment. 
viii) The role of the State, in the prevalent 
development style, entails a structural fiscal fra-
gility. The considerable investment activity of 
the State (infrastructure, creation of public 
enterprises, transfers of capital to the private 
sector), along with the constant expansion of 
social services, have brought with them consid-
erable increases in the tax burden. Nevertheless, 
this has tended to grow less than the participa-
tion of public expenditures in the product, 
because the broadening of tax bases was falling 
behind and often tax obligations were not 
fulfilled. 
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4. . . . and socially exclusionary 
The Latin American development style is not 
only unsustainable in the long term, due to the 
many tendencies towards disequilibrium result-
ing from its structural configuration. It is also 
exclusionary, because in practice it impedes the 
adequate participation of large segments of the 
population in modernization processes and in 
the results of growth. This exclusion limits in 
turn the scope of the development process. 
In spite of the rapid expansion of domestic 
markets, the changes in social structures and the 
social mobility associated with such changes, 
inequalities in income distribution have been 
maintained and have even worsened. Moreover, 
despite the notable improvement achieved since 
the post-war period in some basic indicators of 
living conditions, the percentage of people liv-
ing in absolute poverty has not been reduced. 
The principle of exclusion implicit in the 
unbalanced functioning of the Latin American 
development style works in three main dimen-
sions: the distributive patterns arising from the 
productive structure, the dynamic role of con-
sumption patterns, and the characteristics and 
limitations of the State's redistributive action. 
The redistributive patterns of the productive 
structure systematically reflect the weight of 
structural heterogeneity and underemployment, 
in a vicious circle difficult to overcome. Processes 
of productive modernization and intensive use 
of fiscal capital do not incorporate the total 
labour supply; the available structure of skills is 
incompatible with the demand for skills; and the 
dissemination of technical progress does not 
reach broad strata with low productivity. 
Moreover, the modernization of these strata 
—devoid of the synenergetíc multiplier of better 
co-ordinated productive apparatuses and more 
i n t e g r a t e d soc ie t i e s— would d e m a n d 
investment resources and public programmes 
that far exceed the capacities of the Latin 
American States. 
Since the pattern of imitative consumption 
is costly in terms of domestic resources, the con-
tinual expansion of consumption has been based 
essentially on the prosperity of 30% —or, at 
most, 40%— of the higher incomes of the popu-
lation, which calls for greater wealth to pay the 
higher prices for goods. The lower-income strata 
have been left out of such consumption, even 
though they are increasingly affected by the 
social patterns of aspirations centred around this 
basket of goods. 
In fact, the tendency to reproduce locally the 
consumption patterns of the industrial countries 
carries within it a structural principle of social 
exclusion. Per capita investment —or rather, 
imports per capita— which would be necessary 
to guarantee the whole population access to at 
least the goods that comprise the consumption 
basket of countries whose per capita income and 
average productivity are five to 10 times greater, 
are completely out of proportion with average 
levels of productivity prevalent —or even 
accessible— in our countries. This is the counter-
part to the fact that the profile of the demand for 
productive resources (capital, technology, labour 
and natural resources) derived from the preval-
ent patterns of consumption differs structurally 
from the relative availability of such resources in 
the countries of the region. 
Nevertheless, the State has designed redis-
tributive or supplementary mechanisms which 
correct the distributive patterns arising from the 
productive structure or which moderate the 
inequitable distribution of well-being implicit in 
imitative consumption. The extension of social 
services, the establishment of a network of subsi-
dies, the maintenance of subsidized public rates 
and the providing of jobs and income with the 
State apparatus have been mechanisms of this 
type. But by favouring the recently-appeared 
middle strata, such mechanisms have allowed 
only for a "partial or restricted equity", which 
has not reached the strata located at the bottom 
of the social pyramid. Moreover, the dynamism 
of post-war growth led to substituting the 
demand for "systematic equity" with the demand 
for social mobility and the group of expectations 
that come with it. 
In short, the structurally unbalanced style 
that the Latin American countries developed 
during the post-war period carried within it 
principles of social exclusion. On the one hand, 
underemployment and technological and pro-
ductive heterogeneity provided the bases for 
sharp disparities of income and extended situa-
tions of poverty. On the other hand, the patterns 
of consumption which constitute the dynamic 
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motor of this style and the social aspiration it 
projects turned out to be inaccessible for broad 
segments of the population. But, above all, its 
modes of operation call for continuous expan-
sion of the income and consumption of the mid-
By now it is clear what are the structural roots of 
the debt crisis that affected the countries of the 
region, in the context of changing international 
financial currents. Lax bank loans that recycled 
petrodollars made it possible for the oil-
importing countries of the region to continue 
functioning with their extremely unbalanced 
style and even absorb the shocks of the oil price 
rises. Oil-exporting countries rapidly expanded 
their imports in spectacular fashion, aggravating 
the characteristic features of the Latin American 
development style. Thus, they not only con-
sumed their unexpected profits; they sunk into 
external indebtedness. 
With this scenario, several events took place 
simultaneously at the beginning of the 1980s: 
the international recession, the deterioration of 
the terms of trade, the sudden rise in interna-
tional interest rates —a phenomenon attributa-
ble to the enormous absorption of capital by the 
United States— which unleashed the financial 
crisis that still affects the countries of the region. 
It was the delayed appearance of the crisis of 
the region's development style. Maintaining its 
structural imbalances under control would 
require access to an increasing flow of external 
resources. Moreover, the economic insertion of 
our countries was becoming more and more 
anachronistic in an international context of 
rapid financial transnationalization, radical 
changes in capital flows and higher competitive-
ness, all taking place against the background of 
profound technological changes. External 
indebtedness was like a drug that relieved latent 
conflicts for a time, only causing them to explode 
later on. 
Before the crisis, external capital facilitated 
growth, in its dual role of providing foreign 
die and upper strata of the population, without 
the redistributive action of the State —sustained 
on fiscal bases that are moreover fragile— mak-
ing compensating transfers of income towards 
the excluded strata. 
currencies and injecting investments and tech-
nology. The State, in turn, guaranteed growth 
and the redistribution of income attainable 
within the prevalent style, while inflation acted 
as a mechanism which mediated both short-term 
and structural conflicts. The very context of 
growth constituted a favourable medium, 
although paltry or precarious in some countries 
or periods, for social mobility and the formation 
of broad consensuses, frequently tacit. 
This mode of operation of Latin American 
societies had entered into crisis and its compo-
nents had become obstacles to development. 
1. The turnaround in the transfer of 
external resources 
The net flows of external capital in the period 
1950-1973 were greater than the remittances 
from our countries as profits and interests, leav-
ing the region with a positive net transfer of 
resources.1 Despite being relatively moderate,2 
such flows provided the foreign currencies 
essential for alleviating the structural tendencies 
toward external disequilibrium and were fre-
quently a vehicle for strategic investments and 
the incorporation of technology in modern pro-
ductive strata. 
During the time of "easy capital" (1974-
1981), the magnitude of the net flows of external 
long-term capital trebled in real terms, bringing 
'With the notable exception of Venezuela, which has tradi-
tionally been a net exporter of capital, and of Argentina and 
Uruguay in the period 1960-1972. 
2
 Less than 1% of the product in the larger countries of the 
region (although in Brazil and Colombia it reached 3.5% and 2% 
respectively in 1970-1973). In the Central American countries, on 
the other hand, the net transfers were more significant. 
II 
The crises of development, the debt and the State 
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the net transfer of external resources towards 
the region to an average of 2.5% of the annual 
product, although in some countries it reached 
10% of the product. 
The debt crisis and the subsequent virtual 
rationing of capital, on the one hand, and the 
effect of the high international interest rates on 
the enlarged servicing of the contracted debt, on 
the other, brought the transfers (except in Cen-
tral America) back to levels of between 2% and 
6% of the product (almost 4% of the product on 
the regional level). 
In other words, most Latin American 
countries have become exporters of capital, after 
having been traditionally importers. Only the 
Central American countries, Haiti and Paraguay 
remain net importers of capital. For Latin 
America as a whole, the turnaround in resources 
has been of the order of 6% of the regional 
product: before.the crisis, the region received net 
resources equal to 2% of its product; from 1982 
onwards, it has been transferring abroad almost 
4% of the regional product. 
As a consequence of this turnaround in 
external financing, the countries of the region 
had to adjust their economies in such a way that 
they would generate considerable surpluses, 
when they systematically ran deficits in their 
external trade. Moreover, available resources 
have been reduced, given the magnitude of the 
turnaround of external resources. In practice, 
this contraction was concentrated on 
investment, which diminished in real and 
absolute terms in almost all the countries, to the 
point that its regional significance declined from 
a little more than 23% before the crisis to barely 
16% of the product at present. 
2. The fiscal crisis 
The development style that took shape in Latin 
America after the war implied an expansion of 
the State, so that it could assume its leading role 
in the many dimensions already indicated. This 
gave rise to a structural fiscal fragility, to the 
extent that expenditures systematically tended 
to grow more than tax bases. 
Thus government expenditure reached 
between 15% and 30% of the product (exclud-
ing interest on the debt) in countries where it 
had fluctuated between 10% and 15% during 
the three previous decades. In addition, struc-
tures inflexible to short-term fluctuations crys-
tallized within State administrations, while tax 
revenues tended to be pro-cyclical and to erode 
owing to frequent speedups of inflation. 
Moreover, the capacity to control tax collec-
tion effectively ts weakened by the effect of vari-
able combinations of administrative inefficiency, 
costs of controls, corruption and collusion. In 
such conditions, an increase in tax revenues 
depends on individual tax-payers, and their wil-
lingness declines to the extent to which impor-
tant groups of tax-payers begin to perceive that 
the State's ability to make the structurally unbal-
anced economy function without harming their 
interests is weakening. 
. This structural disequilibrium between 
expenditures and income implies that the 
government is operating with deficits. In some 
countries and periods, such imbalances allowed 
the State to fulfil its function of promoting 
development and redistributing wealth without 
major macroeconomic disturbances, obtaining 
resources from abroad or from the domestic pri-
vate sector. In most cases, however, it led to 
inflationary financing. 
The accelerated indebtedness of the 1970s 
added an unbearable burden to fiscal expendi-
tures, and the underlying fiscal fragility turned 
into an open fiscal crisis. Indeed, the govern-
ments took advantage of the financial bonanza 
of the 1970s in order to finance their deficits and 
the investments of public enterprises through 
external and domestic indebtedness, often recy-
cling part of the external indebtedness of the 
privatesector. Moreover, the crisis of the exter-
nal debt and the demands of the creditors trans-
formed most of the private external debt into 
public or publicly-guaranteed debt. In some cases 
there was the added cost of rescue operations 
—with public resources— of the domestic finan-
cial system. 
Thus, during the last decade, the amount of 
the public debt, external and domestic, and the 
publicly-guaranteed debt, quadrupled as a per-
centage of the regional product. Moreover, more 
than three quarters of the present external debt 
of Latin America (US$416 billion) is that of 
States. Thus, to increased voluntary or "pro-
grammable" public expenditures are added the 
burden of the debt, increased in turn by higher 
international interest rates. 
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Fiscal deficits, which used to represent 1% 
or 2% of the product, have thus reached magni-
tudes of between 5% and 10% of the product, 
the financing of which is all too often 
inflationary. 
The State, a key actor in post-war Latin 
American development because of its roles as 
promoter of new activities, stimulator of aggre-
gate demand and provider of mechanisms to 
redistribute income, has entered into a critical 
phase. The fiscal crisis has not only led to a 
weakening and even an abandonment of the 
activities that allowed the State to fulfil these 
strategic roles; worse still, fiscal adjustment 
extends, by way of recession or inflation, its 
convulsions to the rest of the economy and adds 
more elements of inequity to those already gen-
erated by this development style. 
3. Inflation, the debt burden and the 
domestic transfer of resources 
Inflation became a mechanism for mediating 
structural conflicts, especially in those countries 
or periods in which stronger social organizations 
were able to engage in the struggle over distribu-
tion. Inflation was evident both directly, through 
pressures on costs from wage increases or from 
raising profit margins and the respective index-
ing mechanisms, as well as indirectly, through 
the State fixing key prices: exchange rates and 
import duties, interest rates, minimum wage, 
public tariffs. But the multiform expansion of 
public expenditure was also strongly influenced 
by redistributive objectives, to meet demands 
exceeding the income obtained by each group, 
but which also surpass the effective capacity of 
the State to collect taxes. Whether because of 
pressures on costs or because of the insufficient 
financing of the fiscal deficit, the institutional-
ized struggle for distribution led in the past to 
inflationary processes difficult to manage. 
The structural change necessary for the 
economies of the region that are exporters of 
capital incorporates a new dimension to their 
inflationary processes, as well as to the relation 
between these processes, structural adjustment 
and growth. 
Since most of the external debt belongs to 
the public sector, the transfer of resources to the 
exterior weighs on their financial situation in 
two structurally distinct ways, depending on the 
institutional characteristics of the export sector 
(ECLAC, 1989). 
In the countries where the public sector 
owns most of the main export activities, there is 
a direct link between fiscal accounts and the 
balance of payments, and therefore between fis-
cal accounts and the capacity to transfer resour-
ces to the exterior. When the value of 
public-sector exports falls, they tend to increase 
the fiscal deficit and the external imbalance, gen-
erating at the same time inflationary pressures 
and recessive effects. On the contrary, when 
these exports increase, they tend to improve, 
directly and simultaneously fiscal accounts, the 
balance of payments and the possibility of mak-
ing external transfers without raising taxes or 
recurring to inflationary financing. 
In the countries in which the main exports 
come from the private sector, a rise in exports 
also strengthens the balance of payments; but 
the transfer of resources to the exterior also 
requires that resources be domestically trans-
ferred to the public sector. Given the significance 
of this transfer with respect to tax revenues and 
the difficulty of increasing them, the completion 
of the transfer involves a fiscal deficit, which 
leads to inflationary financing. For this reason, 
even a favourable external trade balance does not 
necessarily lead to an appreciable reduction of 
the fiscal deficit. Even a raise in the real 
exchange rate to promote exports can boost the 
public deficit, by increasing the cost in national 
currency of servicing the external public debt. 
As the experience of recent years shows, 
higher inflation, caused by the struggle over dis-
tribution, the fiscal crisis and the transfer of 
resources to the exterior, has become in itself a 
serious obstacle to growth. As a result, the 
already impoverished situation of the least 
favoured and most defenceless groups of society 
has frequently deteriorated even further. 
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III 
Changes in the international economic order 
The historical context in which our countries 
developed during the post-war period has been 
changing rapidly and profoundly. In the world 
economy long-standing conflicts are being 
solved and potentialities prepared for during the 
prosperity of the long post-war period are being 
realized. There is a transition to new patterns of 
trade, production, technology and organization. 
The international economic order of the 
post-war period was based on free trade, the free 
movement of capital, the financial rules of Bret-
ton Woods and co-operation between the coun-
tries of the OECD. The strategic confrontation 
with the socialist block limited the room for 
manoeuvre and conditioned the functioning of 
that order, which presided over the expansion of 
world trade, decolonization, and the complete 
development of the present pattern of technol-
ogy and production. 
a) The financial scene 
The Bretton Woods system has been 
replaced by a scene characterized by large-scale 
disequilibria and considerable financial and 
exchange instability, although this instability is 
tempered in the last instance by mechanisms for 
consultation which form part of the co-
operation between the main members of the 
OECD. This panorama reflects the greater inter-
dependence that exists among the central econo-
mies, within the framework of internationalized 
financial markets and exchange and interest-rate 
systems basically subject to the forces of those 
markets. 
The countries of the region used this change 
to become easily indebted, but they failed to see 
the consequences for the functioning of their 
development style and for the later management 
of their economic policies. The result is that 
Latin America is virtually rationing financial 
capital in a world where it is flowing in unprece-
dented amounts with increasing facility and 
rapidity. Moreover, the domestic financial sys-
tems of our countries are facing, at growing 
costs, the competition of this global market. 
b) Worldwide technological change 
The new pattern of technology and organi-
zation —based on microelectronics and its 
applications— is transforming the bases of the 
traditional comparative advantages of national 
economies and consequently the very conditions 
of the international division of labour (ECLAC, 
1988). 
Intensified technological change has height-
ened the historical tendencies to weaken com-
parative advantages based on natural resources. 
The savings of material and energy implied by 
information technologies will reinforce these 
tendencies as time goes on. 
Moreover, the dissemination of applications 
of information technology in the production of 
goods and services tends to displace jobs and 
modify the profile of the skills required of 
labour. The effects of such tendencies on the 
comparative advantages which the different 
developing countries have fashioned for them-
selves in the course of their recent industrializa-
tion are complex. For the time being, 
comparative advantages based on cheap labour 
are progressively eroding. On the other hand, 
the availability of relatively unskilled labour 
with a low degree of trade unionization is attrac-
tive for establishing semi-automated industries. 
However, the further advance of automation in 
such activities and the increasing possibilities of 
flexible adaptation to changes in demand can 
operate ¡n the opposite direction. Skills useful 
for the many and growing applications of infor-
matics will, on the contrary, become the basis of 
the new comparative advantages. 
In short, the technological revolution now in 
progress has given a strong impetus to compara-
tive advantages not only in the conventional 
sense, because of the rapidity of change and the 
possibility that it will become even faster in the 
future, but also and especially because compara-
tive advantages tend to depend less and less on 
the natural resources or traditional capacities of 
each country, and more and more on the incor-
poration of knowledge, the development of 
human resources and the progressive acquisition 
of technological and industrial capacities. 
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c) World trade 
World trade continues to develop in a free-
trade framework, limited only by the persistent 
protection that the central countries give to their 
agricultural sectors and partially threatened by 
the rise of protectionist tendencies in those 
countries from the time of the first oil shock and 
the worldwide recession of 1980-1982. 
The volume of world trade has expanded 
more quickly than production, under the impe-
tus of trade in manufactures and mainly in metal 
products, which have increasingly risen as a per-
centage of world trade. The share of non-fuel 
minerals and that of agricultural products, on the 
contrary, have contracted considerably in the last 
two decades (ECLAC, 1983; World Bank, 1987; 
UNCTAD, 1989). 
The price rises for basic products in the 
mid-1970s have been vanishing as they return to 
the tendency to deteriorate in real terms that 
they had exhibited since the post-war period. Oil 
prices have also returned to real levels lower 
than those of 1974 (World Bank, 1988). 
These trends in world commerce reflect both 
the foreseeable transformation of world demand 
towards more refined products and the changes 
already taking place in the pattern of technology 
and the organi2ation of worldwide production. 
These trends have been reinforced by policy 
changes in the central countries, in order to 
promote a reduction of raw material and energy 
The crisis of the development style can only be 
overcome by structural changes involving a new 
development profile of our economies and socie-
ties. This profile needs to have less structural 
disequilibria and to be compatible with the new 
international economic order. Behind this tru-
ism there are many different options regarding 
the social and economic forms that can arise. 
They must, however, fulfil some necessary con-
ditions, made evident by the origin and evolution 
of the crisis itself. 
inputs per unit of product or consumption. In 
addition, in many markets for basic products the 
producer countries are incapable of regulating 
supply, because they are so highly dependent on 
their exports. 
Finally, the prevailing configuration of the 
post-war period —with highly integrated zones 
(the European Community and the countries of 
the CMEA) and others less integrated is under-
going profound changes, as the unification pro-
cess of the European Community speeds up, the 
CMEA liberalizes, the North American trade 
block is formed, and the Asian Pacific displays 
trends towards integration. 
d) The incompatibility of the Latin American 
development style 
The development style that the Latin Amer-
ican countries have consolidated in the last few 
decades is decisively affected by the transforma-
tions taking place in the international economic 
order. The characteristic features of its function-
ing are increasingly incompatible with the new 
pattern of technology and production, the trends 
in world trade and in the international division 
of labour, the instability and unpredictability of 
exchange and interest rates, the massive transfer 
of resources to the exterior, and the situation of 
rationing in a highly fluid world market for 
capital. 
1. Lightening the debt burden 
In the present situation of rationed financial 
capital and high international interest rates, the 
countries of the region are obliged, no matter 
what the state of their debt servicing, to slow 
down their growth and maintain or even reduce 
their already declining per capita consumption 
(ECLAC, 199O). Perhaps, with the sole exception 
of Brazil, they will have to increase their trade 
surpluses, or, as in the case of the Central Ameri-
IV 
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can countries, overcome negative balances. For 
this purpose, they would have to increase their 
exports considerably in relation to an almost 
stagnant product, and at the same time reduce 
their imports, restricting growth and their pro-
cesses of opening up to the exterior. In these 
conditions, probably only the larger countries 
will be able to maintain their current per capita 
product. In most countries it will decline. 
This reasoning is based on the constraints 
imposed by external disequilibria. In many cases, 
the weight of the debt on the fiscal imbalance 
and the impossibility of carrying out the neces-
sary domestic transfers to cover it threaten to 
introduce additional perturbations in the adjust-
ment process, plunging the economy into infla-
tion and recession. 
It is imperative, then, to lighten the debt 
burden, not only for humanitarian and social 
reasons and for political stability. Preparations 
must be made for the transformations of produc-
tion and the reforms of the State needed to 
reorient development towards sustained growth 
and a solid external sector. In the last instance, 
relief from the debt burden is indispensable for 
solving the problem of unpaid debt in the inter-
national financial system and ending the ration-
ing of capital for Latin America. 
Nevertheless, the external debt will proba-
bly continue to be a heavy burden for national 
resources. Beyond proposals which, like the 
Baker and Brady plans, can represent advances 
in understanding the problem and partial efforts 
to solve it, no efficient mechanisms have been 
proposed in the industrial countries for solving 
the dilemma of who will assume the losses of 
capital or finance the necessary compensation. 
Since a complete and punctual servicing of 
the debt is not feasible for the countries of the 
region, they will be obliged to combine periodi-
cal rescheduling with restricting payments, pro-
cesses which will definitely keep them in a 
situation of rationed financial capital. Under 
these conditions, even the decision to transfer to 
the exterior only what is economically, fiscally 
and socially feasible supposes a growth with a 
systematic tendency towards a trade surplus. 
On the other conceivable extreme, the alter-
native of repudiating the debt involves in fact 
removing our countries from the world finan-
cial, commercial and technological networks, 
and most probably holding development back. 
2. Productive transformation, competitiveness 
and technical progress 
Even the integration of long-term prospects 
with the most immediate ones and an advan-
tageous reinsertion of the Latin American coun-
tries into world trade presupposes the 
progressive transformation of their exports 
towards agroindustrial, industrial mining and 
manufacturing lines, all with an increasingly 
technological content. 
Moreover, our countries must gradually and 
simultaneously overcome the structural obsta-
cles which give rise to external vulnerability, 
social exclusion, unco-ordinated production and 
technological weakness. For this purpose, they 
must promote modernization and industrializa-
tion processes based on the increasing incorpo-
ration and dissemination of technical progress, 
with a progressive development of local techno-
logical capacities and training of the labour force. 
Since both processes comprise, in turn, 
necessary conditions for opening the way to 
sustained growth, productive transformation 
based on technical progress and its 
dissemination recovers its leading role on the 
scene of Latin American development. 
Increasing international competitiveness, an 
objective which confers rationality on the 
processes of external adjustment, therefore 
surpasses the possibilities of manipulating 
relative prices in favour of tradeable goods. It 
presupposes the constant expansion of 
technological capabilities, which creates 
potential and goes beyond traditional 
comparative advantages based on the availability 
of natural resources and cheap labour. 
The technical progress upon which such 
processes are based must be disseminated 
through productive machinery, so that 
competitiveness is consolidated as a systematic 
characteristic of their functioning and becomes a 
characteristic feature of future development. 
This requires, in turn, a suitable co-ordination of 
productive activities (Joint ECLAC/UNIDO 
Division, 1986). 
In short, sustained growth, compatible with 
the new international order and with a higher 
degree of social articulation, requires changing 
productive structures in the sense that every type 
of knowledge is more intensely used. This can be 
incorporated in physical or in human capital; be 
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acquired through learning in production or 
through local research and technological devel-
opment; consist of original, adapted or copied 
technology; be obtained through licenses, mixed 
enterprises or through transnational corpora-
tions; or developed in the design of products, 
production or organization. This last modality 
forms part of what is usually called "entrepre-
neurial capability" and constitutes a specific 
mode of knowledge, with a broad field open to 
innovation. 
3. Surplus-producing growth and 
export promotion 
The consequences of the external debt make it 
necessary to adopt growth patterns with a sur-
plus trade balance. On the other hand, moving 
from a pattern based on products with declining 
world markets to another one centred on the 
logic of new comparative advantages tuned to 
the dynamic forces of the world economy 
requires vigorous and flexible export strategies, 
capable of offering new products, but without 
weakening unnecessarily the sales of traditional 
products. Productive transformation based on 
technical progress and the search for systematic 
competitiveness demands, in turn, a difficult 
equilibrium between promoting the capacity to 
compete in producing for the domestic market 
and the protection of technological and indus-
trial capabilities that are valuable, even though 
incipient, and therefore for the moment 
uncompetitive. 
All this highlights the advisability of adopt-
ing strategies for promoting exports. Emphasis 
on imports is counterproductive because it is 
incompatible with the requirement of surplus-
producing growth and with the co-ordination of 
domestic productive systems needed for the con-
tinuous acquisition of new comparative advan-
tages based on technological progress. The 
hypothesis of a "creative destruction" of uncom-
petitive activities in order to stimulate the devel-
opment of export activities tends to squander 
scarce foreign currency and consolidate tradi-
tional specialization. 
The promotion of exports, on the other 
hand, leads in any case to more imports, since it 
calls for competitive inputs, but at the same time 
it generates the foreign currency needed to 
finance them. Both dimensions call for a certain 
degree of selectivity and gradualism, in order to 
reconcile the opening of the system to imports 
with the gradual increase in the capacity to 
import and with the temporary protection of 
new activities with good prospects of being 
competitive. 
4. Changing the sources of dynamism 
The necessary reorientation of development 
presupposes changing the dynamic sources 
of growth, instead of being induced by 
increasing the private consumption of the 
middle and upper classes and public 
expenditure —characteristic of the style 
dominant up to the crisis— this change should 
be promoted by increasing exports and 
investment. 
This overall vision of the needed structural 
changes in demand and in the allocation of 
resources should be interpreted, however, as a 
general picture of the structural transformations 
required for promoting exports and restructur-
ing production based on technological progress. 
The dynamism arising from exports will have to 
originate more and more in the incorporation 
and domestic co-ordination of new export activi-
ties. Investment strategies should take practical 
shape in the promotion of specialties with abso-
lute international advantages; in the consolida-
tion of systematic competitiveness through 
disseminating technical progress; in invest-
ments in human and technological capital; and 
generally in a more efficient incorporation of 
knowledge and technology in productive 
processes. 
5. Changes in patterns of saving 
Strategies for transforming production like 
those suggested here presuppose a decided 
strengthening of investment capacity, in the 
twofold sense of disposing of the necessary sav-
ings and of taking investment decisions that are 
compatible with the reorientation of 
development. 
The need for different kinds of investment; 
the installation of new activities; the moderniza-
tion and reconversion of activities which have 
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already gone beyond the beginning stage; the 
training of human resources and the incorpora-
tion of technology surpass by far the meagre 
rates of investment that the Latin American 
countries have been reduced to by the crisis. 
Besides the situation of rationed financial 
capital, indebtedness constantly drains resour-
ces. The savings potential for financing real 
investment is thus eroded on two fronts. 
Given the reluctance of transnational corpo-
rations to invest in our economies, it should not 
be expected that in the medium term direct for-
eign investment will fill the gap opened by bank 
financing. The cases where such investments are 
attracted by the exploitation of natural resources 
with clear comparative advantages or by domes-
tic markets with prospects for expansion consti-
tute the exception rather than the rule. 
Nor should any great expectations be har-
boured with respect to the huge amount of capi-
tal accumulated in the exterior by residents of 
some of the countries of the region. For the most 
part, these agents already respond to a transna-
tionalized behaviour. Outside of speculative 
movements, in which they use their specialized 
knowledge of local financial markets, these 
agents will probably contribute only a small part 
of additional investment funds over the long 
term. 
On the domestic scene, the crucial question is 
centred on private-investment decisions and on 
the amount and allocation of public investments. 
The weakness of private investment processes is 
associated with the fragility of entrepreneurial 
capacity; with the attractions, particularly in 
inflationary contexts, and the facility of financial 
investments abroad; and with the accumulation 
of external and dynamic economies, of comple-
mentarity and articulation which are not evident 
in market prices nor incorporated in the calcula-
tions of private profitability. 
The magnitude of public investments 
declined considerably when they became the 
main variable of fiscal adjustment. Recovery 
appears to be problematic, given the slowness of 
fiscal reform and of relief from the effects of the 
debt on public budgets. Moreover, the allocation 
of these public investments is usually distorted 
by the budgets and the inertia of the previous 
pattern of allocation as well as by the arbitrari-
ness of budget cuts; these depend more on the 
ease of carrying them out than on the social 
benefits of the investments. 
A strategy of productive restructuring pre-
supposes, therefore, changing the mechanisms 
of investments and incentives. It is a question of 
concentrating public and private investments on 
subsystems of activities that can generate 
dynamic accumulative effects and externalities 
that can be only partially appropriated by indi-
vidual private investment; on the development 
of interrelated technological capacities that offer 
growing social benefits; and on subsystems of 
productive and social co-ordination that facili-
tate the dissemination of technological progress. 
In many cases, public investment or private 
investment "packages" with public financing 
should play a catalytic role both in short-term 
expansion and in the decisions of private invest-
ment. Likewise, public investment or financing 
can comprise a critical ingredient for promoting 
processes such as the suitably negotiated privati-
zation of public enterprises, and the gradual res-
tructuring of industries with inadequate levels of 
operat ional efficiency or in terna t ional 
competitiveness. 
An investment strategy of this nature 
requires changing the mechanisms for generat-
ing and attracting savings. Central to this pro-
cess should be the mechanisms for attracting 
savings from households through the financial 
system; reinvesting private institutional sav-
ings; and increasing the State's tax revenues, in 
order to set up special development pro-
grammes, together with reorienting public 
expenditures towards goals with more social 
benefits over the long term. 
6. Social cohesion 
History shows that long-term development is 
not viable without a certain degree of systematic 
integration and equity, which incorporates all 
levels of society into the modernization process, 
with respect to both their contribution to pro-
duction and to the satisfaction of their demands. 
This minimum of social cohesion may be less 
than what is normally desired or may consist 
over long periods of time of different combina-
tions of social integration, social mobility, equity 
and dynamic articulation of demands and partid-
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pation in production. Proof of this are the four 
decades of Latin American development, 
unequal but rapid; partially co-ordinated, but 
with intense social mobility. However, this same 
experience and that of other regions shows that 
over the long run social cohesion has to increase 
in order to guarantee sustained development. 
On the other hand, the situations that mark 
the present crisis in Latin America illustrate in a 
particularly dramatic way that in the short termi 
we can come dangerously close to minimal 
thresholds of social cohesion, beyond which 
inequity and economic disarticulation can lead to 
all-out social disintegration. 
Above these critical thresholds, the condi-
tion of cohesion can be met, without a doubt, 
with different degrees of equity, as long as the 
different social groups are increasingly inte-
grated into production and demand, and growth 
itself provides sufficient social mobility. This 
makes it possible to compare present situations 
of equity with the image of a more promising 
future, promoting social integration and partici-
pation in the collective efforts to promote 
growth. 
7. Reforming the State 
The task of solving the fiscal crisis in contexts of 
democratic pluralism takes us beyond the realm 
of finance into that of politics and institutions. 
"Fiscal adjustment" is part of the necessary rede-
finition of the functions of the State and of the 
elaboration of new institutional arrangements 
for carrying out, supervising and financing 
them. 
The new institutional arrangements and the 
political agreements that materialize within this 
framework should ensure the participation of 
the people and intermediate associations, which 
would place priorities on demands and balance 
them with effective contributions. The demands 
for public services, social policies, development 
investments or fiscal incentives require as a 
counterpart institutionalized commitments to 
pay taxes or share the cost of meeting these 
demands. 
This principle becomes clear, for example, 
when the effect of the external debt on public 
budgets is examined. Especially in countries 
where the main exports are in private hands, the 
surplus foreign exchange arising from positive 
trade balances finds no adequate counterpart in 
fiscal income equivalent to what the State needs 
to service the external debt. This leads to infla-
tionary financing. The cancellation of the debt 
being excluded, the transfer of resources to the 
exterior should have as a counterpart a transfer 
of resources to the State treasury through tax 
revenues substituted for inflationary taxes, 
which weigh unequally on the population and 
block growth. Current institutional arrange-
ments, then, need to be reformulated, so that 
they generate the necessary tax revenues and 
allow the burden of servicing the debt to be 
shared internally. 
8. Consolidating democracy 
Pluralistic democracy arises from ethical discus-
sion as an undeniable value of human develop-
ment. Ideologically, the author considers 
democracy to be unrenounceable, in the face of 
strategic rationalizations that subordinate it to 
economic and institutional goals. But beyond 
such considerations, the consolidation of demo-
cratic political structures constitutes a functional 
requirement for effectively handling the present 
crisis in the Latin American countries. It must 
provide the necessary reorientation of develop-
ment so as to direct it towards a phase of sus-
tained advancement. 
It is difficult for reinsertion processes, in 
their economic, technological, political and value 
dimensions, to be sustained in the current inter-
national context under authoritarian rigidity, 
which thrives on isolation. In general, the incor-
poration of the productive forces of Latin Amer-
ica into the technological revolution under way 
requires huge doses of creativity, conceivable 
only in atmospheres that are highly interactive 
in freedom and pluralism. In particular, in order 
for the modernization processes to bring with 
them an equitable development style, all the 
segments of society must be able to express their 
demands and pledge their participation in the 
reforms and processes of structural change. 
Moreover, the necessary changes in the patterns 
of saving, designed to consolidate and dissemi-
nate modernization processes, will presumably 
contain elements of concentrating wealth, with 
the support of society as a whole, which will 
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demand as a counterpart modalities of social 
participation in patrimonial rights. The concilia-
tion of both facets of the accumulation process 
can only be achieved through democratic 
methods of consensus. 
The constant negotiation needed to mini-
mize the external debt burden, and especially the 
institutional arrangements for distributing it in 
a fair and balanced —and therefore, stable— way 
presuppose the efficient operation of democratic 
The imperative need to maintain economies 
adjusted in their external and fiscal dimensions 
is undeniable, as is the need to ensure a reason-
able price stability. On the other hand, a return 
to the path of sustained growth cannot be 
delayed. 
However, it appears improper and politi-
cally unsustainable to attempt these adjustments 
without guaranteeing a minimum of equity in 
the distribution of their costs and their benefits. 
It should be recognized that in the present struc-
tural situation, the external adjustment presents 
unavoidable components of inequity. The same 
thing happens with fiscal adjustment, given the 
redistributive effects of a large part of public 
expenditure which ¡s cut and the preferential 
recourse to indirect taxes to increase revenues. 
Public policy, therefore, can only partially safe-
guard the equity of the adjustment processes, 
This will depend to a large extent on whether or 
not these processes effectively bring about 
adjustment, are more expansionary without det-
riment to that efficiency, and promote the struc-
tural change needed to reorient development. 
The sense of social justice is mainly determined, 
then, by the structural characteristics of the 
equity of the development style that it promotes. 
1. Inequity in adjustment processes 
Attempts at recessive adjustment have been 
essentially inequitable. The contraction of 
domestic demand in order to diminish the inter-
mechanisms which allow society to support 
public policies. 
Reforming the State implies redefining its 
functions and working out institutional 
arrangements to carry out, supervise and finance 
them. Such arrangements will be possible only 
by deepening the processes of democratization. 
Fortunately, it is increasingly recognized that a 
return to authoritarianism as a possible means of 
solving the present crisis of the State will only 
aggravate it. 
nal absorption of tradeable goods and thus to 
generate a positive trade balance has brought 
with it reductions in the demand for labour and 
in real wages. The reduction of public expendi-
ture has particularly affected both social services 
and the traditional capacity of the State to pro-
vide additional income and employment. Not 
only were the effects of the contraction of expen-
ditures recessive; the effects of the correction of 
relative prices in favour of tradeable goods were 
also recessive. Given the urgency of the time-
limits for straightening out the external 
accounts, the most important initial effect of the 
devaluations consisted in reducing domestic 
expenditure even more. 
Moreover, the adjustment programmes 
based on the contraction of demand and the 
modification of relative prices turned out to be 
inflationary. The devaluations designed to real-
locate demand raised the prices of tradeable 
goods. But given the rigidity of the prices of 
non-tradeable goods, and especially the mecha-
nisms for indexation and the formation of 
expectations, the devaluations also helped to 
aggravate inflation. The Treasury also had diffi-
culty in reducing its deficit while carrying out the 
transfer of resources to the exterior at the same 
time. 
Inflation, and particularly the hidden tax 
that it implies, is inequitable, since it affects 
more those who have less capacity to negotiate 
or protect themselves: wage-earners, independ-
ent workers, retirees, small stockholders. 
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Finally, the failure of the successive attempts 
at adjustment and stabilization has been deeply 
inequitable by repeatedly exposing the least pro-
tected sectors of society to the brunt of the 
adjustment and by weakening the confidence of 
the more influential in the possibilities of carry-
ing it out and their willingness to participate in 
the effort. 
2. External constraint, employment and wages 
As they operated before the crisis, our economies 
stayed near full employment (with the prevail-
ing wage levels) —despite the tendency to have a 
trade deficit— because of net external financing. 
Adjustments to a situation of external con-
straints, in which the net transfer of resources 
has become negative and a trade surplus needs to 
be generated, presuppose some combination of 
open unemployment and drop in real wages. 
In our semi-industrialized economies, an 
inverse relationship exists in the short term 
between the real exchange rate and real wages. 
Primary exports have little flexibility with 
respect to variations in the exchange rate. Exter-
nal adjustment has an impact, then, on the 
demand for imports and becomes effective 
through devaluation, which raises prices and 
erodes real wages, reducing the consumption of 
wage-earners. In this way (if neither investment 
nor public expenditure vary), the level of activity 
contracts, which adjusts the amount of imports 
and the trade balance to the required 
magnitudes. 
In fact, given the inflexibility toward lower 
margins in industries dedicated to the domestic 
market, in order for the devaluation to lead to a 
rise in the real exchange rate, beyond the infla-
tion that it could provoke, real wages must fall. 
That is achieved essentially through 
unemployment. 
In the structural situation typical of our 
countries, total demand for labour declines to the 
extent that the ratio between the exchange rate 
and wages increases. This happens when the 
reduction of demand for labour in domestic 
activities, brought on by the contraction of con-
sumption, normally surpasses the expansion of 
that demand in the export sector, induced by the 
higher exchange rate. In contrast, the level of 
employment compatible with external equili-
brium is positively associated with this ratio 
(Canitrot and Rozenwurcel, 1986). 
The more inelastic the trade balance is to the 
ratio between the exchange rate and wages, the 
higher the value of the ratio that makes the 
transfer of resources to the exterior compatible 
with full employment, and the higher still the 
value that makes full employment coherent with 
obtaining a trade surplus. But that level of the 
ratio between the exchange rate and wages is 
usually higher than the socially-tolerable maxi-
mum increase of the export sector's relative 
profitability and the deterioration of income dis-
tribution. Given this impossibility, domestic 
demand has to be contracted in an autonomous 
fashion (generally through fiscal policy), adjust-
ing the employment level to that tolerable maxi-
mum (which is a wage minimum). 
This stylization of the alternatives facing our 
economies for adjusting to external constraints 
makes it possible to see the fronts where action 
can be taken to escape from this "equity trap". 
Naturally, lightening the debt burden would 
alleviate external constraints and allow for 
higher levels of employment, with lower real 
wages; or higher wage levels, with the exchange 
rates already reached and employment staying 
the same. Likewise, any social agreement that 
allows for lowering employers' profit margins 
—in some cases, very high— to the benefit of 
wages can alleviate the impact of the high real 
exchange rate on those wages. But what is essen-
tially needed are strategies for structural change 
that favour the competitive substitution of 
imports and especially tend to generate a higher 
volume of exports for each level of the ratio 
between exchange rate and wages and for each 
level of autonomous domestic expenditure. That 
implies diversifying exports and external 
markets and promoting non-traditional exports, 
a more elastic supply and better international 
prices, and above all, a systematic rise in produc-
tivity, by incorporating technical progress. 
In any case, the short-term inequity of the 
adjustment can only be moderated, avoiding 
dogmatically applying prescriptions that are 
unnecessarily recessive or that ineffectually pro-
mote the generation of more foreign exchange, 
stretching resources and the efficacy of social 
public expenditure to the extreme. The short-
ages of today will only be compensated for over 
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the longer term, to the extent that structural 
changes are promoted which make possible a 
more equitable development. 
3. An expansionary adjustment which 
safeguards equity 
In order to moderate the main source of inequity 
of the adjustment processes —recession, with its 
consequent unemployment and low wages— the 
external adjustment must be gradual and moder-
ately expansionary. This presupposes, in turn, 
reducing the net transfer of resources to the 
exterior. Such a reduction is also necessary for 
placing the possibilities of fiscal adjustment 
within attainable limits without inflationary 
financing. 
For the expansionary adjustment not to be 
frustrated by accelerated inflation, stabilization 
policies will have to be adopted which ensure 
that the effort is equitably shared and, at the 
same time, make the results of adjustment credi-
ble, reversing expectations. This gives rise in 
some countries of the region to "heterodox" 
stabilization programmes in which concerted 
income policies are applied together with con-
taining demand and changes in relative prices. 
Changing key relative prices is necessary but 
is not enough to bring about external adjustment 
and reorient development. The relatively high 
interest rates reflect the value of scarce capital in 
our economies and recognize the undeniable 
transnationalization of capital flows. Maintain-
ing a high real exchange rate is necessary to 
Modernization processes compatible with world 
technological trends bring with them, if they are 
considered in isolation, strong elements of social 
differentiation. 
Owing to the key role of technological pro-
gress and the imperious need to create local 
technological capabilities, the strategic centre is 
displaced towards education, formation of 
human resources and training. As a goal, raising 
stimulate production for exports or for import 
substitution and for moving demand towards 
non-tradeable goods and services, the produc-
tion of which uses resources that are abundant in 
our economies. Moreover, the level of the real 
exchange rate compatible with trade-surplus 
strategies, like those which thecountries of the 
region should apply, is higher than the real level 
compatible with trade balance equilibrium. 
Both the restitution of a certain degree of 
equity and the promotion of structural change 
presuppose restoring the financial and opera-
tional capacity of the State. Limiting the debt 
burden is a first step. But the basic solution calls 
for tax reforms and restructuring and rationaliz-
ing public expenditures. 
The recovery of financial and operational 
capacity means that the State must meet, 
through welfare measures, the more urgent 
problems of inequity and poverty. But the State, 
above all, should restructure its expenditures in 
order to form permanent and progressive mech-
anisms for redistributing income. 
Even so, perhaps the biggest challenge fac-
ing the State in our countries is to make the 
investments (infrastructure, human resource 
training, generation of local technological capa-
bilities) needed to promote and facilitate structu-
ral change. These needs, cannot be met with the 
structural adjustment loans now offered. They 
probably require several percentage points of 
the annual product and the establishment of 
effective machinery for execution and 
management. 
the levels of education and the technological 
capacity of the labour force can only result in 
more complex, interactive and equitable socie-
ties. It is, moreover, the way to reduce —or at 
least freeze— the different levels of productivity 
and welfare of our populations with respect to 
those of the industrialized world. 
Nevertheless, factors of social differentia-
tion will foreseeably tend to be generated. 
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Opportunities for training in new technologies 
and employment in highly productive activities 
can expand less than the population and labour 
force. Moreover, the investments needed to raise 
the levels of training and productivity of the 
submerged strata exceed even the enlarged 
investment capacity of the different economies 
of the region. In other words, the eventual mod-
ernizing wave can worsen structural heteroge-
neity and underemployment. 
It is worth asking, then, if the strategic 
response of these countries to the challenges of 
the present consists of another historical phase 
of growth with dualism and social exclusion and, 
especially, if it ¡s probable and inevitable. 
Our hypothesis is that such a response is not 
inevitable, nor viable in the long run. The struc-
tural configuration that controlled the vigorous 
development with social exclusion in the post-
war period is in crisis. In the new international 
order, the conditions of sustained development, 
beginning with the structural configurations 
prevalent in the region, involve processes that 
can constitute the basis of a greater social equity. 
They have to do with the new bases of economic 
dynamism and with the key role of technological 
progress and the incorporation of knowledge in 
production. 
The growth pattern developed before the 
crisis, characterized by structural heterogeneity, 
had to be inequitable and exclusionary in terms 
of well-being. Simplifying perhaps to exaggera-
tion, it was the consequence of i) insufficient 
intensity of knowledge about global production; 
Ü) the high density of physical capital (and, 
therefore, of incorporated knowledge) of the 
expansion of modern activities; üi) the insuffi-
cient co-ordination of production between these 
and traditional low-productivity activities; and 
iv) the insufficient strategic weight of consump-
tion among the masses (a key aspect for the 
degree of the social coherence of development). 
The new patterns of growth should be char-
acterized, as already pointed out, by moving the 
primary sources of dynamism from the domestic 
market and consumption to investment and 
exports; by diversifying exports so that they 
include items with higher contents of knowl-
edge; by reincorporation into international trade 
on the basis of greater systematic competitive-
ness, which requires more co-ordination of pro-
duction; and, finally, by changing the structure of 
production in the sense of a higher relative den-
sity of every kind. 
Such patterns offer opportunities for social 
and productive articulation capable of establish-
ing the dynamic bases of more equitable socie-
ties. Meanwhile, emphasis has to be given to the 
leading role that knowledge will play, particu-
larly the broad field which will open for incorpo-
rating knowledge into physical capital. 
Certain characteristics proper to knowledge 
can contribute to improving distributive struc-
tures. Economic knowledge has a dimension of 
being a public good, so that only part of its 
benefits can be internalized by its authors. That 
explains why private production of knowledge is 
less than optimum and that its socially optimum 
production requires the intervention of the State 
(Mujica and Marshall, 1989). But it also implies 
that its appropriation can be less concentrated 
than its production. This production is, in turn, 
knowledge-in tensive, which reinforces the pro-
cess of generating dynamic externalities in the 
course of growth. Such characteristics are found, 
moreover, at the basis of the dissemination of 
technical progress and provide the opportunity 
of increasing the co-ordination of production, 
which in turn presupposes increasing modern 
activities —and the higher incomes they 
generate— or modernizing low-productivity 
activities. 
On the level of investment, these transfor-
mations should lead to a change of composition 
in favour of investments in human capital and in 
the creation of local technological capabilities, 
and among the investments in human capital, to 
a move towards more incorporated knowledge 
or more complementarity with new labour-force 
skills or new organizational forms. 
Lastly, the lessening of the dynamic role of 
the consumption of the wealthier strata could 
bring with it a weakening of this principle of 
exclusion implicit in the development of the 
post-war period and its replacement by a princi-
ple of social cohesion. That will happen to the 
extent that it is substituted by popular consump-
tion or modalities of collective consumption, 
which meet —even if only partially— the basic 
needs of the population through goods and ser-
vices with more modern characteristics. 
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Thus, the productive changes needed to 
reorient development can lead to more genera-
tion, direct or indirect, of employment per unit 
of investment, to the extent that the productive 
structure changes towards activities which incor-
porate a greater quantity of local knowledge and 
value added and in which domestic articulation 
grows. That is compatible moreover, with the 
need to raise the productivity of capital. 
Nevertheless, the possibility that higher 
productivity of capital may lead to a more equita-
ble wage structure depends to a large extent on 
the degree of dissemination of technical pro-
gress and on profitable investments (growth of 
the segments of small modern entrepreneurs 
and independent professionals). It is also subor-
dinate to higher levels of private profitability 
not being completely appropriated by investors, 
but rather shared through better wages, schemes 
of participative capitalization and higher taxes. 
The technological revolution under way 
simultaneously provides disturbing elements 
and opportunities to support a co-ordinated and 
equitable development. Modernization pro-
cesses based on new technologies can, without 
distinction, worsen social decomposition and the 
exclusionary characteristics of the prevalent 
style, or become a vehicle for new ways of meet-
ing social needs, for the co-ordination of produc-
tion and for participation. 
The former could result from a purely imita-
tive transplant of patterns of consumption, tech-
nical solutions and organizational patterns 
which are developing in the advanced countries. 
But information technologies and new biotech-
nologies also offer the opportunity to establish 
The countries of Latin America face today a 
historic turning-point with projections equival-
ent to those of the crises of the 1930s and 1940s, 
which led to the Latin American development of 
the post-war period. The challenges are enor-
mous. The dynamic reinsertion of the Latin 
systems and develop products that satisfy, in an 
imaginative way and at reduced costs, largely 
postponed needs, so that access to modernity and 
its fruits is extended to the more diverse strata of 
the population. They offer, in particular, the 
possibility of providing ample opportunities for 
suitable education and training. Training is a key 
factor for reconciling the need for manpower 
with the technological capacities required by 
modernization processes and the need to achieve 
more equitable distributive structures, as well as 
the effective access to modernity for the whole 
population. 
To what extent the seizing of these oppor-
tunities would be sufficient, in historically 
reasonable time-limits, for progressively 
absorbing the tremendous numbers of the 
underemployed, swollen by the crisis, is a 
question open to debate. Overcoming unequal 
development requires not only expanding the 
modern sectors, but also progressively raising 
the productivity of broad strata, urban and rural, 
today underutilized. Labour-force training, the 
co-ordination of production and the 
proliferation of small modern enterprises 
constitute the main directions of such a process. 
The motor forces of the market and State action 
must be combined in order to bring together in 
this process investments in human capital, 
physical capital and technology, as well as the 
economic learning that is needed. 
The key factor, however, which will ensure 
that all these elements lead to increased produc-
tivity in all sectors or segments of the economic 
system is the dynamic combination of processes 
of equitable development with a growing social 
cohesion. 
American economies into the international 
economy demands modernization processes and 
the acceleration and dissemination of technical 
progress, in degrees which may not be feasible, 
much less so in view of the required net transfer 
of resources to the developed world and the 
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perspective of endemic adjustment processes. 
Meanwhile, policies have to incorporate the 
need for a permanent adjustment to changing 
external and domestic circumstances and include 
stable elements of promoting structural change 
and safeguarding equity. If we are to get to the 
root of the problem and ensure a more promis-
ing future for the populations of the region, the 
renewal of growth is not enough. Development 
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